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1. Introduction
The permanence of small single-market entities in banking deserves attention because this 
industry tends to be dominated by big-players, whatever the country. This holds true for 
Italy, provided that the deregulation process started in the 1990s and enhanced consolida-
tion and competition. Now, the market configuration is with several big commercial banks, 
a growing number of medium-sized cooperative banks organized mostly in the form of 
‘Popolari’ Banks and the network of BCCs.
BCCs are very small and operate in narrow markets. This appears to be puzzling as two 
forces threaten their survival. First, nowadays a crucial role is played by complex financial 
conglomerates, which force the disappearance of small entities. In a world of big-banks, small 
credit institutions are expected to disappear. Secondly, BCCs historically operated in narrow 
isolated local markets, which, now, are no longer protected because the regulatory barriers to 
geographic expansion have been removed. This reform certainly assured territorial diversity 
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in bank organization, but also caused an increase in competition even in very restricted areas. 
Thus, if local markets become contestable, then it is expected that BCCs will lose their qua-
si-monopoly power which, in the past, guaranteed a certain degree of profitability.1
Notwithstanding the reforms and the expectations of a potential disappearance, BCCs 
are still active in specific niches. They even reinforce their presence over time. Data from 
Bank of Italy (2014) show that at the end of 2013 BCCs totaled 385 (411 in 2011), while in 
the early 1990s there were 700. These figures indicate that the restructuring of the credit 
market has not ruled out the BCCs, which have embarked on a process of M&A to increase 
their size. However, the consolidation process in this network occurred involving mostly 
BCCs, with the result that the number of BCC branches even doubled in ten years, moving 
from 2226 in 1993 to 4454 in 2013. In relative terms, in 2013 BCC branches made up 14% 
of total national branches, which is 4 percentage points higher compared with 1993. This 
process surely reinforces BCC territorial vocation, which tends to expand BCCs’ relative 
role and participation in small markets. In other words, data indicate that BCCs reacted to 
the national restructuring process by re-organizing their network through within-group 
M&A and thus increased their presence in local markets.
Based on these arguments, this paper investigates BCC performance by combining two 
strands of the literature, one focusing on the evaluation of bank efficiency, the other inves-
tigating the determinants of efficiency. Despite the huge literature on bank efficiency – 
exhaustive surveys are Aiello and Bonanno (2015), Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Fethi 
and Pasourias (2010) – few papers have focused on Italy (Battaglia et al. 2010; Dongili, 
Rossi, and Zago 2008; Fontani and Vitali 2007; Giannola and Scarfiglieri 1998; Giannola et 
al. 1997; Girardone, Molyneux, and Gardener 2004). In this regard, the evidence is mixed, 
but some conclusions can be drawn. Larger Italian banks attain lower efficiency levels than 
small banks. Bank efficiency is higher in the North of Italy than in the South. Interestingly, 
a common result from many papers is that Italian mutual-cooperatives perform better 
than other banks in controlling costs.2 This outcome is often explained by the competitive 
advantages that BCCs have over big-banks in terms, for example, of (a) the use of soft 
instead of hard-information, (b) the lean rather than complex organization and (c) the 
short operational distance between banks and customers (see, for example, Alessandrini, 
Presbitero, and Zazzaro 2009; Berger et al. 2005; Carnevali 2005).
With regard to the theme of ‘what’ explains bank efficiency, it is noteworthy that the 
results are contrasting and often not comparable, as model specifications differ from one 
study to another. For instance, much research regards the relationship between efficiency 
and market concentration, socio-economic external conditions, banking structure, and 
access to banking services (Battaglia et al. 2010; Bos and Kool 2006; Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas 2000; Girardone, Molyneux, and Gardener 2004). While part of this literature will 
be reviewed in the set-up of our model (see Hughes and Mester 2008) for a comprehensive 
survey on this topic), here, it is important to say that the main focus of this paper is the effect 
on BCC performance exerted by environmental factors. In this sense, the work of Battaglia 
et al. (2010) is comparable with our work, as it focuses on the efficiency of BCCs over the 
2000–2005 period. They estimate stochastic frontiers by referring only to the sample of BCCs 
and thus proposing ‘within-the-group’ differences rather than providing efficiency scores 
retrieved from the estimations of national banking frontiers. As the authors argue, their 
method allows them to ‘…avoid estimation bias in efficiency scores to strong heterogeneity 
in the sample’ (Battaglia et al. 2010, 1366). It is also worth mentioning that Battaglia et al. 
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(2010) calculate the external variables at regional level. On one hand, their main results 
suggest that BCC efficiency is insensitive to non-performing loans and regional GDP per 
capita; on the other hand, cost efficiency decreases with high spatial concentration of the 
local banking industry and increases with the number of branches.3
The contributions of the paper are twofold. The first feature refers to the empirical set-
ting we propose. In the first step, cost efficiency is estimated within the Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA) by following the specification proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) and, 
above all, considering all Italian banks. This allows discernment ‘within’ and ‘between’ group 
differences.4 In the second step of the analysis, the cost efficiency is regressed against a set 
of predictors of BCC performance. In this regard, the main interest is to evaluate the effect 
of local banking conditions that are measured through several determinants defined at 
provincial level. This introduces the second contribution of the study, which is the choice of 
provinces (NUTS3) as the reference market of BCCs. An analysis based on regions – as in 
Battaglia et al. (2010) and Fiordelisi and Mare (2013) – could suffer from aggregation bias. 
Because BCCs are single-market firms, it is plausible to think that the greater the proximity 
of BCCs to markets the more precise the investigation of the efficiency-environment nexus 
will be. Another advantage of our empirical setting comes from the micro-data we use: we 
refer to the BCC balance-sheet, the contents of which are reliable for territorial studies. 
Indeed, they incorporate the environmental effects, as they are the result of the financial 
relationship between BCCs and the ‘residents’.5 Therefore, the research-question on ‘whether 
and how’ the BCC efficiency is determined by environmental factors becomes intriguing 
because it sheds some light on the relationship between the effects of the restructuring 
process of the entire Italian industry and the performance of the financial entities operating 
in local markets. Another interesting aspect is related to the period under scrutiny, which 
covers the years between 2006 and 2011. This was a period of severe instability in financial 
markets, which has not been deeply studied in terms of the effects on the efficiency of Italian 
mutual-cooperative banks (the exception is Barra, Destefanis, and Lubrano Lavadera 2014). 
The present paper contributes to fill this gap firstly by updating the analysis of the level and 
the dynamics of BCC performance compared with others and secondly by modeling time 
as a determinant of BCCs efficiency.
The paper is structured into six sections. Section 2 describes the local markets; Section 3 
presents the estimating method and reports the frontier estimation; Section 4 focuses on the 
estimated efficiency scores of BCCs compared with other bank-types; Sections 5 is dedicated 
to the econometric results of the efficiency equation. Conclusions are given in Section 6.
2. Banking and the periphery in Italy
This section documents some recent developments of local Italian markets. The discussion 
is conducted at provincial level (NUTS3), which is the geographical disaggregation closest 
to the operating scale of BCCs. Throughout the paper, reference is made to the period 
2006–2011 because of the greater reliability of the micro-data.6
An important effect of the restructuring reform is the spatial diffusion of financial ser-
vices. Several proxies can be used as an indicator of this. In this respect, a valuable index 
is the bank branches by square kilometer, which measures the density by province. The 
density differs considerably across areas, varying from 0.007 in the South to 0.021 in the 
North West in 2006–2011 (Table 1), although it is stable over time (Figure 1(a)). Another 
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valuable indicator is the ratio ‘Bank Branches/Municipalities’ per province, which was, on 
average, more than 5 in 2006–2011 and ranges from more than 8 branches per municipality 
in the provinces of the North East to 3.1 and 3.5 in the North West and in the South of the 
country (Table 1). Along this line of reasoning, further evidence comes from the concentra-
tion of provincial markets. Figure 1(b) reports the Hirschman-Herfindahl index calculated 
using the number of branches per bank (HH1) in every province by year. What emerges 
is that the concentration is quite time invariant (Figure 1(b)), but huge differences across 
provinces still persist. On average, HH1 was 0.12 in the years 2006–2011, ranging from 
the highest value (0.147) in the southern provinces to the lowest (0.099) which is observed 
in the North East (Table 1). Higher average market concentration has been revealed when 
considering total bank assets (HH2).7 In this case, the average value of HH2 is 0.36 (three 
times higher than the average of HH1) varying from 0.45 (North West) and 0.33 (South 
and Center). Importantly, when using HH2 an increasing market concentration is observed 
over time (Figure 1(c)).
Furthermore, there has been a relevant increase of big-bank participation in the periph-
ery. The top-3 national banks – as revealed by the total assets averaged over 2010–2011 – 
owned 21% of bank branches operating in every Italian province. The territorial distribution 
of this market share shows a minimum of 18.7% in the South and a maximum in the North 
West (more than 25%) (Table 1). It is also worth pointing out that in 22 out of 103 Italian 
provinces, the top-3 national banks absorb more than 80% of local total assets.8
An important issue concerns the traditional function of banks, namely the transfor-
mation of deposits into loans. The Bank of Italy provides the required data, taking into 
account the residence of customers. Table 1 and Figure 1(d) summarize this information. 
High values of this ratio mean that the provincial banking sector is issuing out more of its 
deposits in loans at provincial level, which, in turn, means it releases more income. Over the 
years 2006–2011, the ratio Loans/Deposits is on average 1.55, with a minimum (1.18) and 
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Figure 1. Bank density, market concentration and loans/deposits by province (2006–2011). 
source:  elaborations on data from Bank of Italy and Istat. (a) Bank’s branches per square kilometer. 
(b) HH1=Hirschman-Herfindahl index based on the number of branches per bank by province. (c)
HH2=Hirschman-Herfindahl index based on the total assets per bank by province. (d) loans/deposits.
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a maximum (1.81) in the South and in North East respectively. A related aspect to offering 
funds is that loans are not always repaid. In Italy, bad performing loans are 6.38% of total 
loans over 2006–2011, with a different incidence across areas. In the North East, bad-loans 
are low (less than 4%), while they are very high (about 10% of total loans) in the South. 
Finally, there is also great heterogeneity when looking at the credit provided by banks. This 
results from the loans-to-GDP ratio, which ranges from the high value observed in the 
North East (1.85) to the lowest value (around 65% of provincial Value Added) registered 
in the South (Table 1).
This section highlights that the local banking market conditions are still extremely heter-
ogeneous across Italian provinces. This market differentiation further motivates the under-
standing of the nexus between the local determinants and BCC efficiency.
3. The stochastic cost frontier
The econometric analysis is carried out in two steps. First, we consider a very large sample 
of Italian banks and obtain cost efficiency by estimating a stochastic frontier in the specifi-
cation proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). To this end, the cost equation is modeled by 
considering a three-inputs three-outputs model, while the inefficiency equation only con-
trols for bank type (BCC, Popolari and Ltd.) and location effects. In the second step of the 
analysis, BCC efficiency is used as a dependent variable of a cost efficiency regression aimed 
at evaluating the effect of individual and local factors on BCC performance. This section 
briefly presents the methodology used to estimate bank frontiers, while the econometric 
specification of the BCC efficiency equation is discussed later (see Section 5).
The cost function is estimated by employing the SFA that allows banks to be distant from 
the frontier also for randomness (Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 1977; Meeusen and van de 
Broek 1997). In this, SFA differs from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which sup-
poses that the distance from the frontier is entirely due to inefficiency. Again, SFA assigns 
a distribution to the stochastic component of the model and, thus, allows inference to be 
made. Inference, however, is not specific to SFA because of advances in bootstrapping in 
the DEA procedure (Simar and Wilson 2000). A further advantage of SFA derives from the 
specification of Battese and Coelli (1995), which allows a cleaner efficiency measure to be 
obtained comparing it with the model where one first estimates inefficiency using a frontier 
and, second, uses the estimated efficiency-score as the dependent variable in subsequent 
regression (Greene 1993). As shown by Lensink and Meesters (2014) and Wang and Schmidt 
(2002), the standard two-step approach suffers from the fact that the inefficiency is assumed 
to be identically and independently distributed in the main frontier equation, while it is 
determined by other variables in the inefficiency equation.9 The following function Fc (.) 
indicates the cost of producing an output y given a price w:
From equation (1), the efficiency can be expressed as the ratio of the minimum cost of 
a potentially efficient bank to the cost actually observed:
(1)Costit = Fc
(
y,w
)
evc euc
(2)CE =
Fc
(
y,w
)
evc
Fc
(
y,w
)
evc euc
= e−uc
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We use the Translog function to model the frontier. It satisfies the assumptions of 
non-negativity, concavity and linear homogeneity (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). After
taking into account the constraint of homogeneity10 in relation to input-prices (
∑
n
휔n = 1), 
the cost frontier in the log-linear form (wr is the price of deposits) is:
where Cost is total bank costs; yj represents the jth output, with j=1,2,3; wn is the cost of 
the nth input, with n=1,2,3; α, β and ω are the parameters to be estimated; u is the ineffi-
ciency; v is the random error. Finally, we assume that vit is normally distributed with mean 
zero and uit is distributed as a truncated normal. Again, vit and uit are independently and 
identically distributed:
where z’η is the linear predictor of inefficiency.11 The econometric specification of the 
inefficiency component is:
where Zltd and Zpop are two dummy variables equal to unity if the ith bank belongs to the 
group of Ltd. or Popolari, respectively (the base group comprises the BCC), whereas Zcentre 
and Zsouth are equal to unity if the headquarter of the ith bank is in the Center or in the 
South of Italy (the base group is formed by banks located in the North of the country). These 
dummy variables guarantee that the efficiency scores are net of any geographical and institu-
tional fixed effect. Moreover, eit is the erratic component. Finally, efficiency is time-variant, 
ensuring a change in relative ranking among banks. In other words, this accommodates the 
case where an initially inefficient bank becomes more efficient over time.
The data source used to estimate the efficiency is ABI (Italian Banking Association), 
which comprises the balance sheets of 96% Italian banks. Individual bank variables are used 
to estimate the three-inputs three-outputs frontier models (equation (3)). Appendix Table 
A1 displays the variables employed in defining the frontier, which were modeled by referring 
to the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley 1977). Appendix Table A2 reports the 
summary statistics. Regressions were performed through the simultaneous estimation of 
equations (3) and (6) and were run by using more than 3700 bank-observations. Results 
from estimating the cost frontier are in Table 2.
After observing that the coefficients of the Translog frontier are almost all significant,12 
the first meaningful result regards gamma, which is the ratio of the variance of the ineffi-
ciency to the variance of the composite error. The estimated gamma parameter is always 
(3)
log
(
Cost
wr
)
= 훽0 +
∑
j
훽j log yj +
∑
n
휔n log
wn
wr
+
+
1
2
[∑
j
∑
s
훽js log yj log ys +
∑
n
∑
q
휔nq log
wn
wr
log
wq
wr
]
+
+
∑
n
∑
j
훼nj log
wn
wr
log yj + u + v
(4)vit ∼ iidN(0, 휎
2
v )
(5)uit ∼ N
+(z�휂, 휎2u)
(6)uit = 휂1 zltd + 휂2 zpop + 휂3 zcenter + 휂4 zsouth + eit
8514 F. AIello AND G. BoNANNo
high, indicating that inefficiency significantly contributes to determining the distance from 
the frontier. This evidence is confirmed by the Likelihood Ratio test, which verifies the cor-
rect model specification of an SFA. It considers the Ho that all the parameters in equation 
(6) are equal to zero: if this hypothesis is accepted, then the OLS estimates will be consistent 
because the composite error comprises only randomness. Results indicate that the LR is
47.814 and, therefore, Ho is rejected at 1% (Table 2).
With regard the results related to equation (6), it is also important to underline that the 
dummy variable ZLtd has a positive sign, implying that the average level of cost efficiency 
is higher for BCCs than for Ltd. The sign of the ZPop coefficient is also positive, thereby 
indicating that BCCs obtain higher cost efficiency levels than Popolari. To explain the geo-
graphical effect, banks with their main office in the Center of Italy obtain low inefficiency 
compared with banks of Northern Italy.
4. Cost efficiency across bank type
This section presents the estimated cost efficiency and aims to understand better BCC 
performance compared with the other banks. A brief investigation is conducted in to what 
extent BCC efficiency differs from the rest of the sample and this discussion is complemented 
by calculating some balance-sheet ratios.13
Table 2. Banking cost frontier in Italy. translog results (2006–2011).
significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05;  ‘.’ = 0.1; ‘ ‘ = 1. 
+ 1% lr critical value as in Kodde and palm (1986). 
source: own elaboration of data from aBI and Bank of Italy.
Cost
β0 −3.713***
β1 (Loans) 0.729***
β2 (Commission Income) −0.241***
β3 (Securities) 0.442***
ω1 (Labor Cost/Cost of Deposits) 1.128***
ω2 (Cost of capital/Cost of Deposits) 0.344***
β11 0.092***
β12 −0.100***
β13 −0.086***
β22 0.056***
β23 −0.004 
β33 0.047***
ω11 −0.025 .
ω12 −0.095***
ω22 0.122***
α11 −0.060***
α12 0.084***
α13 −0.030***
α21 0.068***
α22 −0.065***
α23  0.008
Zltd 0.092***
Zpop 0.157***
Zcentre −0.127***
Zsouth  0.032
σ2 0.064***
훾 =
휎
2
u
휎
2
0.323***
log-likelihood 229.414
lr test 47.814***
(14.33)±
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Table 2 indicates that BCCs dominated the industry, as they amount to, on average, 
63% of the sample. Moreover, it emerges that bank size ranges from €7029 million in 2006 
to €7884 million in 2011. In this respect, BCCs are very small compared with the others. 
Their size is, on average, €286 million, which is about 30 times smaller than the average size 
of other banks (€7884 million). Data also suggest that BCCs activities are not diversified. 
This holds either in terms of income diversification (the ratio is, on average, 0.23 for BCCs, 
0.36 for others) or loans diversification (0.33 versus 0.38). The ability to transform Deposits 
into Loans is lower for BCCs than others (on average 1.49 versus 2.48). Interestingly, the 
ratio Equity/Total Assets of BCCs is significantly lower than that observed for the other 
two bank groups: on average, it is 0.015 for BCCs and 0.098 for others. This implies that 
BCCs show a higher financial dependence than others, regardless of assets risk, unlike the 
regulatory capital ratios.
An analysis of efficiency yields interesting evidence regarding the marked differences 
in banking behavior. BCCs result to perform better than other banks. On average, cost 
efficiency is 0.90 for BCCs and 0.87 for other banks. This implies that, in order to be full 
efficient, BCCs should reduce the inputs of only 10% offering the same banking services (or 
similarly they should increase outputs of 10% with the same inputs). With regard the other 
banks, the inefficiency rate is 13%. As can be seen from Table 3, the evidence that BCCs 
perform better than other banks holds even year-by-year: the average level of cost efficiency 
is 83% for BCCs and 75% for the others in 2006, declines up to 2008 and shows a slight even 
irregular recovery in the two subsequent years. In 2011, the distance between BCCs and their 
counterparts is less than 9% percentage points of efficiency. These time-changes highlight 
two facts. On the one hand, it is a fact that BCCs and the other banks register high cost 
efficiency during each year under scrutiny. On the other hand, BCCs always perform better 
Table 3. Bccs’ and other banks’ performance. Bank size, efficiency scores and some balance-sheet ratios, 
by year.
note: *average value  of total assets, expressed as the ratio between the total assets and the number of banks of each group. 
constant values  in millions of euros – nIc Index Istat, base year = 1995.
**the number of bank changes year-by-year because (i) the dataset does not comprise the balance-sheet of some minor 
and small banks in 2010 and 2011; (ii) some banks have ceased to operate; (iii) a few banks were involved in a very limited 
number of m&a.
source: own elaboration of data from aBI.
BCCs
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006–2011
Income diversification 0.25452 0.20855 0.17811 0.24047 0.24748 0.23898 0.22814
loans diversification 0.34658 0.33555 0.32512 0.32714 0.30569 0.31187 0.32567
loans/deposits 1.29296 1.35194 1.42448 1.38888 1.41727 2.07432 1.48684
equity/total assets 0.01712 0.01850 0.01594 0.01229 0.01551 0.01263 0.01539
cost efficiency 0.90653 0.89640 0.89382 0.89726 0.89541 0.90531 0.89904
size* 241 257 278 301 318 328 286
no. of Bccs** 431 436 428 414 406 404 2519
other banks
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006–2011
Income diversification 0.42092 0.29260 0.23903 0.39408 0.42302 0.40802 0.36323
loans diversification 0.40031 0.38062 0.38410 0.39782 0.34836 0.35499 0.37861
loans/deposits 2.53152 2.34515 2.39291 1.97645 2.61914 3.08037 2.47589
equity/total assets 0.09150 0.09214 0.09916 0.10927 0.09836 0.09916 0.09837
cost efficiency 0.87392 0.86392 0.85452 0.86599 0.86703 0.87342 0.86611
size* 7,029 7621 8132 7784 7811 8621 7884
no. of other banks** 255 257 261 272 242 227 1514
10
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than the other banks, in the sense that BCCs make better use of inputs and outputs than 
any other group. The difference found in the average values is confirmed when considering 
the entire distributions of cost efficiency. Figure 2 considers all the bank-year observations 
and reveals a substantial heterogeneity between and within bank-groups.
5. Explaining BCC cost efficiency
The analysis has proved that the Italian banking sector is still highly heterogeneous and that 
the BCCs perform better than other banks. This section combines these two outcomes and 
presents the results obtained when estimating the role of provincial market conditions on 
BCC performance. Subsection 5.1 presents the equation of cost efficiency. Subsections 5.2 
and 5.3 focus on the role played by individual and external variables, respectively.
5.1. The cost efficiency equation
Cost efficiency varies between zero and unity. Thus, a Tobit model would be appropriate to 
estimate an efficiency equation, as made by others (Casu and Molyneux 2003; Gillen and 
Lall 1997; Huang and Fu 2013; Jimborean and Brack 2010; Shao and Lin 2001). However, 
Tobit models perform well only if upper and lower bounds come from non-observability, 
thereby implying that the variability in the range [0;1] does not itself support the use of a 
Tobit model. Indeed, when no zero and unity observations of the dependent variable are 
in the sample, the results from Tobit models overlap those obtained from standard OLS 
(Maddala 1991; McDonald 2009). Based on this, the following transformation is adopted: 
CETRANS=ln(CE/(1–CE) where CE is the cost efficiency of BCCs that were retrieved from the 
joint-estimations of equations (3) and (6) made in the first step of the analysis. Therefore, 
the efficiency equation is given by:
0
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Figure 2. distribution of cost efficiency of Italian banks over the 2006–2011 period. Bccs versus other 
banks.
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where CETRANS
it
 is the transformed cost efficiency of the ith BCC at time t. XI and XE 
comprise, respectively, a set of individual and environmental variables meant to exert an 
effect on BCC performance. Finally, eit is a random disturbance. The efficiency determi-
nants defined at bank level are related to the capital structure, size and diversification of 
BCCs activities, while the variables at provincial level are meant to gauge the relationship 
between efficiency and market concentration, spatial diffusion of banking services, density 
of demand, credit risk and the role of economic development of each province.
The empirical strategy followed to estimate equation (7) is to apply random effects and 
fixed effects models and to control for endogeneity by considering the Hausman-Taylor 
specification (Hausman and Taylor 1981). Table 4 displays the results. The first three col-
umns of data report the estimates obtained when considering the equation of cost efficiency. 
In more detail, column 1 presents the estimates from a random effects model, column 2 
refers to results from a fixed effects model, while column 3 shows the Hausman-Taylor 
estimates. Table 5 displays the results obtained when a sensitivity analysis is performed 
by using the fixed effects model. To this end, we restrict the sample according to the cost 
efficiency distribution: the sample in column 1 refers to the 1st and the 99th percentiles of 
BCC cost efficiency; column 2 reports the results when considering the BCCs comprising 
between the 5th and the 95th percentiles of the efficiency distribution; the distribution 
around the 25th and the 75th percentiles is analyzed in column 3.14
(7)CE
TRANS
it
= 휔0 + 휔1X
I
it
+ 휔2X
E
it
+ eit
Table 4. the determinants of Bcc cost efficiency. estimations from re, fe and Ht models (2006–2011).
legend: *p<0.1 **p<0.05  ***p<0.001.
source: see table 1. 
P-values are in brackets.
Dep. var.: BCCs cost efficiency
Fixed effect model random effect model Hausman Taylor model 
Intercept 14.1848 ** 3.2267 13.6109 **
Bccs individual level
Size
ln(total assets) 0.0574 * −0.0703 *** 0.0340
Diversification
loans −0.1918 ** −0.3631 *** −0.1796 **
Income 1.6548 *** 1.5540 *** 1.6183 ***
Capital structure
equity/total assets −1.7907 *** −1.7436 *** −1.8090 ***
Provincial level
market concentration 0.0626 ** 0.0415 * 0.0575 **
credit quality −0.3004 −0.2984 −0.2338
demand density 0.0011 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0013 ***
Branches density −62.7752 −36.2377 ** −60.4645 ***
Gdp per capita −0.0079 ** −0.0064 * −0.0074 **
time −0.0064 * −0.0002 −0.0060 **
obs 2133 2133 2133
f-fisher (p-value) 88.45 (0.000) – –
wald (p-value) – 905.09 (0.000) 939.48 (0.000)
Hausman test (p-value) – 80.23 (0.000) 2.72 (0.9095)
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5.2. Cost efficiency and BCC individual factors
This section presents the estimates obtained when analyzing the effect on efficiency exerted 
by BCCs’ individual variables. The first issue regards the role of size. While much research 
documents that efficiency is directly related to size, there is no consensus on the sign of the 
effect. Some authors show that the effect is positive (Andries 2011; Drake 2001), whereas 
others argue that efficiency decreases with size (Pilloff 1996). In our setting, SIZE is meas-
ured by the logarithms of total assets of each BCC.15 It emerges that cost efficiency tends 
to increase with size. This indicates that economies of scale are at work: following Hauner 
(2005) it appears that dimension affects the costs of inputs, even in the case of Italian BCCs.
Diversification of activities is relevant for BCC efficiency. It is argued that income from 
traditional bank activities suffers lower volatility than other financial uses and then the 
higher the share of risky activities the lower the exposure to systematic risk (Vallascas and 
Keasey 2012). However, it is not certain that the higher betas coming from diversification 
compensate the costs for diversifying the sources of income (Baele, De Jonghe, and Vennet 
2007; Wagner 2010). This means that there is no expectation on the link between income 
diversification and bank efficiency. In this paper, diversification is measured as income 
diversification and loans diversification (see Table 3). Results from income diversification 
suggest that the business model matters, as the estimated coefficients are positive, implying 
that Italian BCCs would gain from diversifying their business rather than focusing only on 
intermediation (income diversification). With regard to loan diversification, the effect is 
negative. From this, it appears that BCCs would save costs by offering traditional services 
(loans) to their member-customers.
Table 5. sensitivity analysis. estimations from fixed effect model.
legend: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.001.
source: see table 1.
P-values are in brackets. 
Cost efficiency distribution
1%-99% 5%-95%  25%-75%
Intercept 2.4254**
Bccs individual level
Size
ln(total assets) 0.0541 * 0.0854 ** 0.1069 **
Diversification
loans −0.1804 ** −0.2563 *** −0.1014
Income 1.6335 *** 1.5767 *** 1.1651 ***
Capital structure
equity/total assets −1.8125 *** −1.7692 *** −0.8102 **
Provincial level
market concentration 0.0591 ** 0.0601 ** 0.0528 **
credit quality −0.3803 * −0.5042 ** −0.5203 **
demand density 0.0010 ** 0.0011 ** 0.0009 **
Branches density −74.21 −90.24 * −127.41 **
Gdp per capita −0.0074 ** −0.0075 ** −0.0040
time −0.0043 −0.0037 −0.0008
obs 2124 2010 1263
f-fisher (p-value) 85.96 (0.000) 69.33 (0.000) 34.99 (0.000)
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Another aspect that the study addresses is the relationship between efficiency and the 
capital structure. Indeed, the financial capital is related to exposure to risk in a sense that 
the more indebted a bank the higher the risk of failure that arises in situations of systemic 
crisis (Acharya and Viswanathan 2011). In other words, less equity implies higher risk 
taken and greater leverage, which results in higher borrowing costs. Again, a high level 
of leverage directly affects funding costs, since paid interests imply less profitability for 
the bank in the income statement (Berger and Mester 1997). From these arguments, it is 
reasonable to assume that more leveraged BCCs face high funding costs and then register 
low efficiency scores. In our regressions, the capital structure is proxied by the ratio Equity/
Total Assets, which ranges from 0 (highly leveraged BCC) to 1 (financial independence). 
From an empirical point of view, the equity-to-total assets ratio is found to affect nega-
tively the cost efficiency, meaning that an increased amount of capital, for instance as the 
requirement of regulation, can act as a binding restriction and thus is perceived by BCCs 
as a cost. Furthermore, the evidence also confirms that the most indebted BCCs register 
high financial cost and thus low cost-efficiency.
These conclusions are robust to every sample of BCCs used in the sensitivity analysis 
(Table 4). However, the average effect displayed in Table 4 hides two specificities that the 
sensitivity analysis helps to capture. For instance, looking at Table 4 we learn that the impact 
of BCC size is always significant but varies across efficiency distribution. Restricting the 
regression to the 1263 observations lying in the third and fourth quartiles of the efficiency 
distribution (column 3 of Table 5) yields a size effect on cost efficiency which is almost two 
times higher than that obtained when excluding the extreme outliers of the distribution, 
that is the observations between the 1% and 99% of the distribution (column 1). Finally, the 
sensitivity exercise shows that the role of leverage in the middle of the efficiency distribution 
is lower than that estimated when using wider samples (Table 5).
5.3. Cost efficiency and environmental factors
Turning back to the specific objective of the paper, it is worth discussing the empirics on 
how the provincial market conditions affect BCC performance. The presentation begins 
with market concentration, which enters into regressions to gauge the effect of the consol-
idation process observed in banking markets. It is measured using the Herfindahl Index 
and Total Assets (HH2) in each province, as defined and discussed in Section 2. This is 
an issue addressed in many works (Casu and Girardone 2010; Dongili, Rossi, and Zago 
2008; Fontani and Vitali 2007) aimed at verifying whether a higher industry concentration 
influences bank efficiency. The uncertainty of the outcome is due to the fact that, on the 
one hand, the operations of consolidation have resulted in an increase in size with an eye to 
probable and expected increases in efficiency levels. On the other hand, high concentration 
can cause an increase in banks market power and, therefore, a reduction of bank efficiency 
(Turati 2008). We find that market concentration is positively related to BCC efficiency. 
This evidence is robust to every check (Table 5) and is consistent with the efficient structure 
hypothesis (Berger 1995; Goldberg and Rai 1996). Phrased differently, in local concentrated 
banking markets, each BCC is induced to be more and more efficient, exploiting economies 
of scales and thus acquiring stronger market positions in the narrow reference markets. This 
explains and motivates the sign on the estimated parameter: in provinces with high market 
concentration there would be a dominance of efficient BCCs. Arguments that increased 
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market concentration leads to efficiency improvements are also provided by Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2001) and Casu and Girardone (2010).
Regarding the spatial access to banking services, it is reasonable to argue that banking 
efficiency in the local market can also be affected by the branching that has occurred in Italy 
over the last 20 years, after the removal of barriers to expand banking activities. In more 
detail, it can be expected that the higher the number of branches the less BCC efficiency. 
This is why a large number of branches exerts the negative effects of individual efficiency 
because the operating costs to provide banking services increase. Moreover, local mar-
kets with a high number of branches (in terms of spatial dimension) would suffer from 
over-dimensioning, which acts against efficiency. However, the sign may be different, as 
the big-bank participation in small markets can be positive due to the increases in the 
capital brought by big banks, the expertise brought in risk management and increases in 
competition (Delis and Papanikolaou 2009; Hannan and Prager 2009). This phenomenon 
is measured province-by-province with the number of bank branches per square kilometer 
(cf. Figure 1(a)). Results are in line with the expectation against branching as the estimated 
parameter of Branch Density is always negative (Tables 4 and 5). This means that Italian 
BCCs suffer from the huge branch opening process occurring throughout the country. The 
estimated negative sign might be due to the fact that the presence of many bank branches in 
local markets forces individual BCCs to invest more for serving more customers (other than 
members), whose expectations remains to increase their benefits from loans and deposits at 
advantageous conditions. Other things being fixed, the increased number of bank branches 
in local markets and the BCCs’ strategies act against BCC.
Another issue that the study addresses regards the effect on efficiency due to demand 
effects. The hypothesis is that BCCs that operate in markets with a lower density of demand 
face higher expenses to find customers asking for banking services (Fries and Taci 2005). 
Thus, the higher the density demand, the higher will be the banking efficiency levels. These 
effects are gauged by the demand density expressed as total deposits per square kilometer. 
Estimations displayed in Tables 4 and 5 show that BCC cost efficiency is positively related 
to demand density, whatever the method used to estimate equation (9). The evidence sup-
ports the hypothesis: BCCs working in provinces with a high level of deposits face, ceteris 
paribus, lower costs in mobilizing deposits and making loans.
In order to gauge the effects of systemic market risk on individual efficiency, we refer 
to the variable Credit Quality, which is expressed as the bad loans to total loans. Here, the 
question is: do BCCs gain or lose from operating in local markets with poor credit-quality? 
It is likely that BCCs operating in risky markets are exposed to potential efficiency losses 
caused by higher costs of screening and monitoring activities. Results depend on the sample 
we consider. When using all BCCs, individual cost efficiency is not related to the local finan-
cial markets riskiness (Table 4). However, credit quality matters when looking at different 
samples across efficiency distribution. What clearly emerges is that the relationships with 
the member-customers – which are long-dated and based on the use of soft-information – 
are not enough to protect BCCs from market riskiness. On this see also Gutiérrez (2008) 
and Coccorese (2009).
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that the level of local economic development is an 
important factor of bank performances, because it affects numerous factors related to the 
demand and supply of banking services (mainly deposits and loans). To this end, the income 
per capita (Y/POP) is used as measure of development. It is expected that provinces with 
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higher Y/POP are assumed to have a banking system operating in a mature environment 
and this results in more competitive interest rates and efficiency margins. They can also 
exert more financial activity. The results given in Tables 3 and 4 show a negative relation-
ship between cost efficiency and economic development, which is consistent with the view 
according to which the higher the development of an area the higher the operating and 
financial costs the BCCs would incur in offering services (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 2000).
6. Conclusions
The central theme of this paper is the efficiency of BCCs, which, despite the reforms, remain 
important players in local markets. This issue is addressed from two different perspectives, 
one focusing on the analysis that generates the bank efficiency, one investigating the role of 
individual and local market-specific factors affecting BCC efficiency.
While the study shows that BCCs perform better than other banks, and thus supports the 
viability of BCCs in local markets (Fiordelisi and Mare 2013), its most important contribu-
tion regards the analysis of the determinants of BCC efficiency. In this respect, we find that 
BCC cost efficiency is inversely correlated with the individual financial independence and 
the loans diversification, while the contrary holds regarding income diversification and size. 
Finally, over the period 2006–2011, the study emphasizes the positive relationship between 
efficiency and market concentration. Other robust insights come from the demand density 
and the branch density, which positively affect cost efficiency. The evidence from credit 
quality indicates that BCCs’ cost efficiency appears not to be related to the riskiness of local 
banking markets. This outcome can be interpreted as the effect of potential higher interest 
rates that BCCs charge to ‘marginal’ borrowers when these are rationed by other banks.
Notes
1.  The process of institutional reforms has been regulated by several norms, such as, for instance, 
the 2002 budget law, the 262/2005 law and the 353/2006 Legislative Decree. Details on these 
reforms are in Giannola (2009), Messori, Tamburini, and Zazzaro (2003) and Silipo (2009).
2.  This result is found in Ayadi et al. (2009), Battaglia et al. (2010), Giannola et al. (1997),
Giannola and Scarfiglieri (1998), Girardone, Molyneux, and Gardener (2004), Giordano and 
Lopes (2006, 2012), Fontani and Vitali (2007), Dongili, Rossi, and Zago (2008) and Turati
(2004).
3.  Another recent paper focusing on BCC performance is Fiordelisi and Mare (2013), which
defers from ours because they analyze how efficiency affects the probability of default of
cooperatives instead of analyzing the determinants of individual efficiency as we do. After
controlling for regional environmental variables meant to be good predictors of default,
Fiordelisi and Mare (2013) prove that, over the 1997–2009 period, the probability of BCC to 
survive increases with efficiency.
4.  As Bos and Kool (2006) argue, studies that do not take into account differences between
bank-type yield inappropriate conclusions about bank performance. On the contrary, using
a wide sample of banks allows net efficiency measures to predict how BCCs are ranked under 
the assumption that banks operate in an equivalent environment.
5.  The relationship between individual efficiency and external determinants might be evaluated 
at branch level, whatever the bank-type. However, data at branch level are not available in
Italy – as well as in many other countries – because they are classified as sensitive-statistics.
6.  Two different data-aggregations are needed for addressing the issues we pose. The first
concerns data at bank level, while the second regards the geographical aggregation we refer to. 
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Data on individual banks are from the Italian Banking Association (ABI). When considering 
the provincial level (NUTS3) we use different data sources (Bank of Italy, Italian Institute of 
Statistics, Istituto Tagliacarne). The period under scrutiny covers the years 2006–2011. This 
is why the implementation of International Accounting Standards (IAS) occurred in 2005 
and banks’ balance sheets before-and-after IAS are not comparable.
7.  Data needed to calculate HH2 is the value of total assets by the ith bank in every province
j (TAij). Because this information is not freely available in Italy, as well as in many other
countries, we proceed through this calculation: TAij=TAi*bij, where TAi is the balance-sheet
amount of Total Asset (TA) of the ith bank and bij is the proportion of branches of bank i in
province j (bij=BBij/BBj). This procedure is proposed by Carbò Valverde et al. (2003).
8.  Alessandria, Aosta, Como, Imperia, Mantova, Milan, Novara, Pavia, Torino, Belluno, Arezzo, 
Grosseto, Massa, Siena, Lecce, Agrigento, Caltanissetta, Enna, Messina, Ragusa, Siracusa,
Trapani (data at level of single province are available upon request).
9.  Following Battese and Coelli (1995) allows us to address the issues brought up by Lensink and 
Meesters (2014) and Wang and Schmidt (2002). Phrased differently, we use a variant of the
SFA traditional two-step approach, as in the first step we basically exploit all the advantages
provided by the stochastic frontiers specification proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), while 
the common use of two-step procedure refers to Battese and Coelli (1992).
10.  Using a translog, linear homogeneity also requires standard symmetry (βjs = βsj and ωnq = ωqn)
and linear restrictions of the cost function (
∑
n
휔nq = 0 and 
∑
n
훼nj = 0).
11.  As in many other recent papers in the banking efficiency literature (see, for example, Battaglia 
et al. 2010; Giordano and Lopes 2008; Lensink and Mester 2012) the assumptions on vit and
uit are those originally proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), also because modeling other
‘possible correlated structures of the technical inefficiency effects and the random errors in
the frontier’ (Battese and Coelli 1995, 327) goes beyond the scope of this work.
12.  We implement an LR test to verify the correctness of the Cobb-Douglas versus the Translog. 
Under H0 there is the more parsimonious model, which is rejected at 1%.
13.  The balance-sheet ratios are (a) the income diversification defined as [Income Commissions/
(Income Commissions+Net Interests Income)]; the loans diversification expressed as (1–
Loans/Total Assets); the Loans/Deposits ratio and the Equity/Total Assets ratio.
14.  Here it is important to provide some model diagnostics. To this end we consider two tests. The
Hausman test is conducted to assess the appropriateness of random or fixed effects models.
Failure to reject Ho indicates that the random specification is valid. Results are in favor of fixed
effect specification. Furthermore, the Hausman-Taylor specification is compared with the fixed 
effects model. In the Hausman-Taylor specifications, all variables at bank level are treated as
endogenous, while environmental variables are assumed to be exogenous. Even in this case,
the test supports the fixed effect model, given that the difference in estimated coefficients is
not statistically different. This implies that bank-level variables may be treated as exogenous.
15.  It is important to say that the size-efficiency nexus may not be the same whatever the size,
because nonlinear effects can arise (Andries 2011; Berger and Mester 1997). To this end, we
have augmented the basic equation with SIZE2 and, alternatively, with the logarithm of SIZE. 
In both cases, estimations are not significant, implying that there is no-linearity (results are
available upon request).
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Table A1. definition of the variables included in the cost functions.
variables Name Description
y1 loans loans to customers. It includes current accounts, repurchase agreements, mort-
gages, credit cards, personal loans and salary-backed loans, transactions relating 
to financial leasing and factoring, business loans, structured debt securities and 
other securities
y2 commission income revenues arising from non-traditional loans and deposits of banks. It includes 
incomes from trading of financial instruments and currencies, custody and 
administration of securities, business consulting, management of insurance 
products, collection and payment services, collection services.
y3 securities sum of loans to other banks, equities and bonds
x1 labor number of employees
x2 capital Gross Banking product, expressed as the sum of loans, direct and indirect 
funding.
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variables Name Description
x3 deposits debts to customers
w1 labor cost ratio of the personnel expenses to the number of employees
w2 cost of capital ratio of the other expenses (commission expenses, operating costs, depreciation 
of fixed assets, the administrative costs that do not relate to personnel expenses 
and the interest expenses that do not relate to those calculated on deposits) to 
the Gross Banking product 
w3 cost of deposits ratio of the interest expenses to the debts to customers
Costs (y, w) total costs w1x1 + w2x2 + w3x3=administrative expenses + depreciation of fixed assets + In-
terest expenses + operating costs + commission expenses 
Table A2. average values  of costs, input and output (2006–2011). 
(constant values  in millions of euros – nIc Index Istat, base year = 1995).
variables obs. mean S.D. min max
cost 3766 161,456.60 856,024 378.2148 20,100,000
y1=loans to customers 3766 1,712,072 8,435,175 1.45 182,000,000
y2 = commission income 3766 27,212.08 133,176 0.72 2,880,022
y3 = securities 3766 716,470.30 5,922,604 206.47 154,000,000
w1 = labor cost 3758 53.14 20.50 7.12 712.77
w2 = cost of capital 3766 0.0595 1.0283 0.000048 44.81
w3 = cost of deposits 3741 0.0135 0.0344 0.000008 1.25
Source: See Table 1.
